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A Review of Dual Class Share Structures in Canada and a 
Proposal for Reform 
 




The publicly traded corporation has long been a source of legal 
debate and controversy. In the 21st century, however, a combination 
of highly publicized corporate scandals and financial improprieties 
has centered the debate surrounding publicly traded companies on 
the topic of corporate governance. Corporate governance refers to the 
framework by which business corporations are managed and 
controlled,1 and each corporation has its own unique internal 
characteristics and organization that impact the way it is governed. 
One such aspect is a corporation’s equity ownership structure that 
sets out the types of shares to be issued to the public, and the rights, 
responsibilities, and degrees of control that each share confers on its 
respective owner. This paper focuses on the contentious topic of dual 
class share structures in Canada.  
 
At their core, dual class share structures refer to a particular 
corporate equity structure in which different classes of common 
shares are issued, each with distinct voting and control rights.2 While 
organizations like the Shareholder Association for Research and 
Education (“SHARE”)3 and institutional investors like the Ontario 
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1 Thomas Clarke, International Corporate Governance: A Comparative Approach 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2007) at 2. 
2 Dual class shares may include non-voting shares, restricted voting, and 
subordinate voting shares. 
3 Second Class Investors, The Use and Abuse of Subordinated Shares in Canada 
(April 2004), at 5, online: SHARE: Shareholder Association for Research and 
Education <www.share.ca/files/Second_Class_Investors_1.pdf> [SHARE]. 
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Teacher’s Pension Plan (“OTPP”)4 have argued that dual class share 
structures reduce non-controlling shareholder wealth and ought to be 
banned from Canadian public stock exchanges, the evidence for this 
claim is less than conclusive.5 Others, particularly financial analysts, 
have argued that in some instances dual class firms have exhibited 
better stock market performances than even the widest held firms. 
This paper aims to examine both the favourable and unfavourable 
characteristics of dual class share structures, and argue that these 
equity arrangements create a precarious controlling-minority 
structure (“CMS”)6 that increases agency costs and financial risks to 
non-controlling shareholders. 
 
Part I of this paper provides an overview of the general structure of 
public corporations and how dual class firms fundamentally differ 
from other forms. In addition, a brief review of the history of dual 
class share structures in Canada is provided as well as their current 
relevance in Canadian capital markets. Part II examines the 
arguments supporting dual class firms and the potential economic 
benefits they can yield for society as a whole. While it is 
acknowledged that some examples suggest that dual class firms are 
an effective corporate governance structure, it is argued that these 
tend to be the exception rather than the rule. Part III examines, 
through the use of two models, how dual class share structures 
increase the agency costs and financial risks to non-controlling 
shareholders. Specifically, it is argued that as a controlling minority 
shareholder’s equity in the firm decreases, agency costs for non-
controlling shareholders tend to rise at a rapid rate. Part IV 
                                                
4 Ontario Teacher’s Pension Plan, Shareholder Rights Issues: 4.2 Dual Class Share 
Structures, online: Ontario Teacher’s Pension Plan < 
http://www.otpp.com/wps/wcm/connect/otpp_en/home>. 
5 John L. Teall, Governance and the Market for Corporate Control (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2007) at 46. “The wealth impact of dual class recapitalizations is not 
clear. For example, Partch (1987) finds no evidence of shareholder wealth 
reductions resulting from dual class recapitalizations. However, after expanding 
the data set of Partch from 44 firms to 94 and including recapitalizations from 
1984 to 1987, Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) found that shareholders experience 
significant negative abnormal returns from dual class recapitalizations.” 
6 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, & George G. Triantis, “Stock 
Pyramids, Cross Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency 
Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights” in Randall K. Morck, ed, 
Concentrated Corporate Ownership (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2000) at 295. 
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demonstrates how these increased agency costs and financial risks 
occur. Particularly, it is argued that CMSs erode the traditional 
internal and external monitoring mechanisms that serve as effective 
monitoring and disciplinary mechanisms in more dispersed 
ownership structures.7 Part V considers the current regulatory regime 
surrounding dual class firms and argues that these limited provisions, 
specifically the 1987 coat-tail provision, are largely inadequate to 
manage the enhanced risks and agency costs that CMSs pose to non-
controlling shareholders. However, rather than espousing the 
positions of SHARE and OTPP, Part VI of this paper proposes that 
the benefits of dual class firms be harnessed under a more 
appropriate regulatory regime that better mitigates the risks they pose 
to non-controlling shareholders. In particular, it is argued that the 
provincial implementation of a mandatory voting cap restriction is a 
practical step towards improving the regulation of dual class firms 
and minimizing the added agency costs they pose to non-controlling 




To properly understand these issues, it is important to examine the 
basic governance structure of a traditional public corporation and 
how it differs from CMSs, as well as why dual class firms are a 
relevant issue in Canadian capital markets. Public corporations, in an 
effort to raise capital and expand, issue ownership shares to the 
general public.8 Investors, both individual and institutional, 
contribute financial capital to the firm in the hopes of realizing a 
profit through the appreciation of the firm’s shares and the 
distribution of dividends. Shareholders elect and delegate decision-
making rights to a board of directors who, in turn, appoint corporate 
managers responsible for the firm’s day-to-day operations.9 The 
managers are accountable to the board of directors, and the directors 
are accountable to the shareholders. This separation of ownership 
from control gives rise to the principal-agent problem, which was 
                                                
7 Dispersed ownership structures refer to firms in which no single shareholder 
owns enough shares to exercise complete control over the company. 
8 Tara Gry, “Dual Class Share Structures and Best Practices in Corporate 
Governance” Library of Parliament (18 August 2005) at 2, online: Parliamentary 
Information and research Service 
<http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0526-e.htm>. 
9 Ibid. 
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famously described by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in their 
book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property.10 Michael 
Jensen and William Meckling further developed this concept in the 
1970s in their piece Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. According to Jensen and 
Meckling, directors and managers, acting as agents, often have 
greater access to corporate information and wield more direct control 
over the firm and, as a result, can use their positions to act in their 
own self-interests rather than those of the shareholders or 
principals.11 The costs borne by shareholders of managerial and 
directorial indiscretion and the resources required to monitor such 
actions are referred to as agency costs. As a result of the risks that 
the agency problem poses to shareholders, various laws and 
corporate governance mechanisms have been implemented. 
Examples include the legal requirement that directors have a 
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation,12 the 
granting of ownership positions in the firm to management to better 
align their interests with those of shareholders, and a host of financial 
disclosure and reporting requirements.13 Perhaps the most important 
corporate governance mechanism for influencing management 
behaviour and protecting shareholder interests is a shareholder’s 
right to vote. The right to vote permits shareholders to elect the board 
of directors, to vote on corporate policy changes, and, in some 
instances, to approve executive compensation arrangements and 
appointments.14 Most corporations issue shares that each yield one 
vote. Under this equity arrangement, voting rights are proportionate 
to the amount of equity held in the firm, and thus the more equity 
invested, the more influence an investor has on the decisions of the 
corporation. However, the effectiveness of an investor’s right to vote, 
which in theory is intended to offer all shareholders a degree of 
control and influence on the board, is largely restricted in 
corporations employing a dual class equity structure. 
 
                                                
10 David Millon, “Theories of the Corporation” (1990) Duke LJ 201 at 214. 
11 Ibid at 230. 
12 John A. Willes & John H. Willes, Contemporary Canadian Business Law: 
Principles and Cases, 8th ed (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2006) at 322. 
13 Gry, supra note 8. 
14 Ibid. 
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In a dual class share structure, there are two classes of equity 
securities—superior and inferior voting shares.15 The number of 
votes that each share wields differs according to its class. In some 
cases, superior shares carry multiple votes while inferior shares carry 
only one. In other instances, superior shares carry one vote while the 
inferior shares are non-voting. It is important to note that both forms 
of subordinated shares are permitted to trade on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (“TSX”), Canada’s largest stock market.16 Instead of the 
traditional management-shareholder agency relationship described 
above and characteristic of more dispersed ownership structures, 
these arrangements give rise to a unique agency relationship between 
controlling minority shareholder(s) and non-controlling shareholders. 
 
Distinct from a situation where an individual or group owns a large 
share position and, in turn, an equal number of votes, dual class share 
structures manipulate the typical one share to one vote ratio and 
allow voting rights to exceed cash flow rights.17 These equity 
structures can be created at the time of a company’s initial public 
offering (“IPO”) or can be implemented later through a 
recapitalization or reorganization.18 By creating multiple classes of 
shares, founder(s) of corporations often keep the higher voting stocks 
for themselves, decrease their equity in the firm, and sell the non or 
reduced voting stock to the public in order to raise the necessary 
capital. According to Professor Paul Halpern of the Rotman School 
of Management at the University of Toronto, “without the dual class 
structure, a firm that has significant growth opportunities would have 
to issue voting equity with a resulting loss in control to the 
founder(s).”19 Another motivation for the issuance of two distinct 
classes of shares, according to Halpern, is to permit the founder(s) of 
the company to reduce their equity investment in the firm in an effort 
to diversify their own personal portfolios.20 Professors Lucian 
Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, and George Triantis of Harvard Law 
                                                
15 Paul J.N. Halpern, “Systemic Perspectives on Corporate Governance Systems” 
in Stephen S. Cohen & Gavin Boyd, eds, Corporate Governance and 
Globalization: Long Range Planning Issues (Northampton: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Inc., 2000) at 32. 
16 Gry, supra note 8 at 3. 
17 Cash flow rights refer to claims that a shareholder has on the cash payouts of the 
firm. 
18 SHARE, supra note 3 at 7. 
19 Halpern, supra note 15. 
20 Ibid. 
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School argue that this pattern of ownership creates an unstable 
“controlling-minority structure because it permits a shareholder to 
control a firm while holding only a fraction of its equity.”21 It is these 
structures, which increase agency costs for non-controlling 
shareholders and expose them to potentially exploitative behaviour 
on behalf of the controlling minority shareholder, that are a fairly 
common feature of Canadian capital markets. 
 
The use of dual class shares as a corporate financing mechanism in 
Canada is largely rooted in mid-19th century changes to corporate 
statutes. Professors Stephanie Ben-Ishai and Poonam Puri of 
Osgoode Hall Law School attribute much of these changes to the 
shifting economic values of that period.22 Particularly, they claim 
that the encouragement of the private initiative led to changes in 
corporate legislation that “increasingly allowed corporations to vary 
the one vote per share allocation through their by-laws or articles of 
incorporation.”23 For example, the Ontario Joint Stock Companies’ 
Letters Patent Act of 1874 stated that “at all general meetings of a 
corporation every shareholder was entitled to as many votes as he 
owned shares in the company, unless expressly provided otherwise 
by letters patent or by-laws of the corporation.”24 However, despite 
legislation permitting the issuance of all types of dual class shares 
between 1874 and 1953,25 their popularity in Canada did not firmly 
take hold until the late 1970s.26 
 
In 1975, only 5 per cent of companies listed on the TSX used some 
form of dual class share structure.27 However, by 1987 this number 
had grown to more than 15 per cent.28 According to a study 
conducted by Burgundy Asset Management between December 31, 
1987 and December 31, 1995, 29.2 per cent of the 413 companies 
listed on the TSX had a dual class share structure.29 Randall Morck, 
Jarislowsky Distinguished Professor of Finance at the University of 
                                                
21 Bebchuk, supra note 6. 
22 Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Poonam Puri, “Dual Class Shares in Canada: A Historical 
Analysis” (2006) 29 Dalhousie LJ 117 at 121. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid at 122. 
25 Ibid. 
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Alberta, argues that the rise of pyramidal control (which 
encompasses dual class share structures) during the final decades of 
the 20th century is, in part, related to the elimination of the 
Inheritance Tax in 1972.30 With shares held by estates being treated 
as sales or deemed dispositions upon death for the purposes of 
income tax, Morck claims that families were encouraged to maintain 
perpetual control of their corporate interests so as to transfer assets to 
their progeny in a virtually costless manner.31  
 
While increasing investor opposition (particularly from institutional 
investors) suggests that the use of dual class share structures in 
Canada may be in decline, an estimated 25 per cent of corporations 
listed on the TSX still maintain some form of dual class shares.32 
Included in these statistics are some of Canada’s largest and most 
renowned firms, such as Four Seasons Hotels Inc., Rogers 
Communications Inc., Bombardier Inc., Telus Corp., and 
Quebecor.33 Typically, a founder or their family maintains control in 
each of these corporations by means of a superior voting class of 
shares. For instance, the Bombardier family has only 17.5 per cent of 
the equity invested in the firm, but due to its superior voting Class A 
shares that each wield 10 votes, the family controls 59.7 per cent of 
the firm’s total outstanding votes.34 A more extreme example is the 
Stronach family of Magna International Inc., who, until recently, 
controlled 66 per cent of the firm’s votes with only 0.6 per cent of 
Magna’s total equity.35 With controlling minority shareholders 
owning very little of the firm’s total equity, the potential exists for 
these individuals and their families to exert their control in an 
attempt to extract greater financial returns and private benefits. Such 
benefits may include exclusive use of company resources and assets, 
excessive compensation packages, and other non-pecuniary items 
like prestige and status.  
                                                
30 Randall Morck et al, “The Rise and Fall of the Widely Held Firm: A History of 
Canadian Corporate Ownership” in A History of Corporate Governance around 
the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, November 2005) 65 at 145. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Gry, supra note 8 at 4. 
33 SHARE, supra note 3 at 11. 
34 Ibid at 12. 
35 S. Khalil & M. Magnan, “Dual-Class Shares: Governance, Risks, and Rewards” 
(2007, May/June), at 2, online: Ivey Business Journal 
<http://www.iveybusinessjournal.com/article.asp?intArticle_ID=693>.  




Furthermore, dual class share structures pose a very real concern in 
Canadian capital markets, particularly for Canadian retail investors. 
As recent statistics indicate, 46 per cent of the Canadian population 
owns shares in publicly traded companies.36 The primary objective of 
many of these investors is to fund their future financial plans and 
retirement. Dual class share structures, however, do not align with 
the goals of many investors because this type of structure tends to 
enhance, rather than mitigate, financial risk. The byproduct of dual 
class share structures is to effectively shift the burden of financial 
risk towards the non-controlling shareholders while simultaneously 
insulating controlling minority shareholders from loss. However, 
despite the enhanced risks that CMSs pose to non-controlling 
shareholders, it is important to recognize that dual class structures 
are not entirely negative. The next part of this paper will consider the 
arguments in favour of dual class share structures as well as some of 
the benefits they can produce for investors and society as a whole. 
 
II. Dual Class Shares: Not All Bad 
 
There is some agreement between both proponents and critics of 
CMSs that without the availability of dual class equity arrangements, 
founders and entrepreneurs would be reluctant to take their firms 
public due to the resulting loss in control. It is argued that this will 
lead to a curtailment in the growth of new and emerging companies 
who will either choose to remain private or seek less flexible forms 
of financial capital, such as debt financing.37 As a result, the potential 
exists for reductions in innovation, investment returns, job creation, 
and overall economic growth in Canada.  
 
In addition, some proponents of dual class share structures argue that 
such arrangements are largely the result of the limits that the federal 
government imposes on the level of foreign ownership of Canadian 
companies.38 For instance, under section 26(1) of the federal 
Broadcasting Act, which provides the Governor in Council the 
discretion to issue binding directions to the Canadian Radio-
television and Telecommunications Commission (“CRTC”), the 
                                                
36 Gry, supra note 8 at 2. 
37 Ibid at 5. 
38 SHARE, supra note 3 at 15. 
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issuance and granting of broadcasting licenses has been prohibited to 
governments other than the Government of Canada and to persons 
who are not Canadian citizens or “eligible Canadian corporations”.39 
Similarly, the Telecommunications Act and the Insurance Companies 
Act, stipulate that foreign ownership limits of companies within these 
industries may not exceed 20 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively.40 
In accordance with these legislated limits, proponents of dual class 
share structures maintain that such equity arrangements can serve as 
an effective mechanism for the protection of Canadian ownership 
interests in industries traditionally considered economically or 
culturally sensitive.41 In pursuit of protecting national interests, 
Canadian controlling minority shareholders can maintain control of 
firms in these particular industries while still raising financial capital 
on a global scale as “many foreign investors have happily bought 
into structures of this sort.”42 It is notable, however, that the 
Canadian government does not require dual class structures nor does 
it even recommend such measures in the furtherance of this policy 
goal.43 Rather, the federal government simply requires companies to 
respect their related ownership limits. For example, Bell Canada 
Enterprises is required to maintain strict foreign ownership limits but 
does so with a single class of shares.44 Once a foreign investor has 
surpassed this ownership threshold, Bell Canada has the authority to 
force the sale of those shares in excess of that limit in order to 
comply with its legislated limits.45  
 
Lastly, proponents of dual class share structures also tout the 
efficiencies of such equity arrangements by quoting powerful 
                                                
39 Stikeman Elliott LLP, Broadcasting and Telecommunications: Section Q of 
Stikeman Elliott’s Doing Business in Canada, online: Stikeman Elliott LLP 
<http://www.stikeman.com/images/core/Q_Broadcasting_and_Telecommunication
s.pdf>. See also Broadcasting Act, SC 1991, c 11, s 26(1). 
40 See Telecommunications Act, SC 1993, c 38, s 16(3)-(4). See also Insurance 
Companies Act, SC 1991, c 47, s 619; Investment Limits (Foreign Companies) 
Regulations, SOR/92-274, s 4. 
41 Barry Reiter, “Dual Class Shares: Not the Enemy” Lexpert (7 October 2010) at 




43SHARE, supra note 3 at 15. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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corporate examples like Google Inc., Warren Buffett’s Berkshire 
Hathaway Inc., the Blackstone Group, and Mastercard.46 In support 
of these examples, it is argued that dual class share structures provide 
the controlling minority shareholder with an entrenched and 
protected position from corporate takeovers that allows other 
shareholders to benefit from the long term value of the founder’s 
vision and entrepreneurial spirit.47 However, while it is undeniable 
that some of the best performing and managed companies in Canada 
and the world employ dual class share structures, this does not 
detract from the fact that such firms enhance potential agency costs 
and financial risks to non-controlling minority shareholders. These 
increased agency costs and concerns are best exemplified through a 
look at the models and research conducted by Professors Bebchuk, 
Kraakman, and Triantis. 
 
III. Increased Agency Costs to Non-Controlling Shareholders 
 
Based on the findings of their research, Bebchuk, Kraakman and 
Triantis primarily argue that as cash flow rights or equity ownership 
of the controlling shareholder declines, the agency costs to non-
controlling shareholders tend to rise at an alarming rate.48 They 
examine this trend in two specific instances: project choice and 
decisions on scope.  
 
Project choice refers to a controller’s decision amongst various 
investment options. The authors argue that in choosing between two 
distinct projects, a controlling minority shareholder will typically 
choose the project that produces the greatest personal return. For 
instance, projects A and B will each yield a total value composed of 
cash flows available to all shareholders, and private benefits 
available only to the firm’s controlling minority shareholder (project 
= cash flows + private benefits).49 In choosing between these 
projects, the authors argue that, depending on the amount of equity 
the controlling minority shareholder has invested in the firm, it is 
possible that he or she may choose not to maximize total value and 
instead may opt for the choice with the largest private return. 
Furthermore, the authors assert that as the controller’s financial 
                                                
46 Ibid. 
47 Gry, supra note 8 at 5. 
48 Bebchuk, supra note 6 at 296. 
49Ibid  at 301.  
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investment in the firm declines, the difference in total value between 
each project will become less important to the controlling minority 
shareholder relative to the private benefits they can extract.50 In this 
sense, controlling minority shareholders are often in a position in 
which they can make decisions that maximize their own personal 
returns. If their cash flow rights are large, they can opt for the project 
that yields the greatest value to the firm, which increases the value of 
their equity investment while perhaps still yielding some personal 
benefits. On the other hand, if their cash flow rights are small, 
controlling minority shareholders can opt for the project with the 
largest private benefits while externalizing much of the resulting 
decline in share price to non-controlling shareholders, thereby 
increasing overall non-controlling shareholder agency costs. 
 
These same agency costs and wealth diverting activities can occur 
when a controller decides to expand or contract the scope of a firm’s 
operations. The authors explain that this can occur in two ways. First, 
assume an asset confers a total value, which, similar to above, is 
composed of cash flows to the firm and private benefits. If the firm 
owns this asset, the controlling minority shareholder may refuse to 
sell it and distribute its proceeds (likely in the form of dividends) to 
non-controlling shareholders so as to maintain the private benefit. 
Alternatively, if the firm does not own the asset, the controlling 
minority shareholder may choose to have the company purchase it 
(rather than distribute these funds via a dividend to non-controlling 
shareholders or employ those funds in some use that increases 
overall firm value) in order to obtain the private benefit that the asset 
may yield.51 Consequently, on the basis of these models, it is evident 
that the potential for private gains can distort the decisions of 
controlling minority shareholders and may encourage them to utilize 
the firm as a vehicle for expropriating non-controlling shareholder 
wealth. 
 
IV.I The Erosion of Internal Monitoring Mechanisms 
 
While it can be argued that firms that issue a single class of equity 
shares are also plagued by agency costs, an important distinction 
between single and dual class firms lies in the effectiveness of their 
                                                
50 Ibid at 302. 
51 Ibid. 
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internal and external monitoring mechanisms. In a single class firm, 
much of the internal and external governance mechanisms remain 
intact and effective, especially in highly developed capital markets 
like Canada. However, in the case of a dual class firm, these internal 
and external governance mechanisms are largely curtailed and any 
oversight function they serve in a dispersed ownership structure is 
effectively eliminated. 
 
As indicated above, a shareholder’s right to vote is one of the most 
important means of ensuring that their interests in the corporation are 
heard and protected. By electing directors, introducing shareholder 
proposals, and raising issues concerning corporate performance 
(often at the Annual General Meeting (“AGM”)), shareholders are 
responsible for monitoring the decisions of the board and 
managers.52 In theory, if management is underperforming, directors 
have the right to remove and replace those managers in the interests 
of the corporation. Furthermore, if shareholders are dissatisfied with 
the level of their representation on the board or any major decisions 
of the directors, they can, at the next AGM, vote to elect new 
directors.53 In this sense, shareholders, as an oversight mechanism, 
serve as an important element in the overall internal governance of a 
corporation.  
 
However, in a dual class firm, non-controlling shareholders are 
largely deprived from fulfilling this function as the controlling 
minority position generally assumes this role. With superior and 
often absolute voting power, controlling minority shareholders can 
elect a plurality of the directors, dominate board decisions, and can 
often run the corporation to further their own interests.54 For 
example, according to Robert Bertram, former Executive Vice 
President of the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board, “there are 
only two or three people on the Magna board who could be 
considered independent of Frank Stronach.”55 Though some may 
argue that a controlling position can act as a more effective 
                                                
52 Erik Banks, Corporate Governance: Financial Responsibility, Controls and 
Ethics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004) at 282. 
53 Willes, supra note 12 at 328-329. 
54 Bernard Simon, “Many Shares, Little Power for Change” The New York Times 
(8 May 2003), <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/08/business/many-shares-little-
power-for-change.html> [Simon]. 
55 Ibid. 
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monitoring mechanism than other more dispersed ownership 
structures (similar to the role that financial institutions serve in the 
co-determination corporate governance models common in 
Germany),56 there is a lack of internal mechanisms that can in turn 
monitor the controlling minority shareholder. With voting power no 
longer tied to equity, even large institutional investors cannot 
monitor or counterbalance the influence, activities, and interests of 
controlling minority shareholders.  
 
Moreover, in a 1999 study of the ownership structures of the 20 
largest firms in the 27 wealthiest economies, Professors Rafael La 
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer find that in 69 
per cent of cases,57 individuals and families that control firms are 
also involved on the board and management, serving as either the 
Chairman or Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), or both.58 The 
authors also state that this data does not include those instances 
where an individual who has married into the family is serving in 
either a board or management position, as they typically do not have 
the same last name and therefore were not identified by the study. In 
Canada, due to the voting influence that controlling minority 
shareholders typically wield, they can influence decisions on the 
election and appointment of corporate directors and officers. In many 
cases, controlling minority shareholders or their family members 
have and, in some instances, continue to serve as Chairman, CEO, or 
both. For instance, Peter Munk, founder of Barrick Gold 
Corporation, who is also the firm’s controlling minority shareholder 
by means of a dual class share structure, has, at times, served as 
either the Chairman or CEO, or both.59 In the case of Bombardier 
Inc., Laurent Beaudoin, who is the son-in-law of company founder 
Joseph-Armand Bombardier, served as both the firm’s Chairman and 
CEO from 1979 to 1999.60 Perhaps the most notable example of this 
                                                
56 John W . Cioffi, “Adversarialism versus legalism: Juridification and litigation in 
corporate governance reform,” (2009) 3 Regulation & Governance 235 at 241. 
57 Rafael La Porta is the Nobel Foundation Professor of Finance at the Tuck School 
of Business at Dartmouth. Florencio Lopez de Silanes is a Professor of business 
and economics at EDHEC Grande Ecole in France. Andrei Shleifer is a Professor 
of economics at Harvard University. 
58 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, “Corporate 
Ownership Around the World” (1999) 54: 2 The Journal of The American Finance 
Association at 496. 
59 Ibid, at Appendix 2. 
60 SHARE, supra note 3 at 12. 
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is Conrad Black of the Canadian company Hollinger Inc., which 
served as the holding company of Hollinger International and a 
myriad of media and newspaper companies. Black was accused and 
convicted of expropriating more than $400 million from the firm 
through his roles as Chairman, CEO, and controlling minority 
shareholder.61 Though it would be overly presumptuous to claim that 
in all instances where controlling minority shareholders are involved 
in both board and management positions corporate abuses and 
improprieties will necessarily arise, it is reasonable to suggest that, at 
the very least, the risk of conflicts of interest are enhanced. Halpern 
argues that the controlling minority shareholder acting in these roles 
“maintains the power to include or exclude any shareholder 
proposals” that are raised at the AGM, and can dictate the majority 
of corporate decisions regardless of other shareholder approval.62 
Consequently, while controlling minority shareholders may be in an 
advantaged position to monitor management and directors, the fact 
that they are often managers and directors themselves largely erodes 
the internal monitoring function of the board, and increases their 
propensity for appropriating non-controlling shareholder wealth. In 
this sense, the fact that controlling minority shareholders are often 
involved at both the board and management levels increases the 
potential for conflicts of interest to arise, particularly in “non-arms 
length” transactions, and ultimately ends up suppressing the internal 
supervisory function of the board.63  
 
 
IV.II The Erosion of External Monitoring Mechanisms 
 
Though it is evident that in a controlled corporate structure many of 
the internal monitoring mechanisms are extinguished, there are also 
external mechanisms that can work to discipline majority equity 
holders and management. Specifically, the two primary external 
disciplinary mechanisms are the securities market and the market for 
                                                
61 Frank Ahrens & Peter Slevin, “Conrad Black, 3 Others Indicted: US Says They 
Looted Parent of Chicago Sun-Times” The Washington Post (18 November 2005) 
at para 11, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/11/17/AR2005111700910_pf.html>. 
62 Halpern, supra note 15 at 9. 
63Yvan Allaire, “Dual-Class Shares in Canada: Some Modest Proposals”, online: 
(November 2006) at 6. Social Science Research Network: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=952043> . 
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corporate control. However, while these mechanisms prove highly 
effective in cases of dispersed ownership structures and controlled 
firms where control is achieved through a majority equity stake, the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms is largely stifled in cases of dual 
class share structures.  
 
In the securities market, a firm’s share value generally serves as an 
indication of its overall performance. Accordingly, the securities 
market signals the success of a company by rewarding it with a 
higher share price, or signals poorer results with a lower share price. 
In the case of a firm with dispersed ownership, prolonged 
underperformance will translate into shareholder dissatisfaction. And 
through investor pressure and voting rights, underperforming 
directors and management will, in theory, be removed.64 In a firm 
with concentrated holdings, where control is achieved through a 
majority equity position, the securities market can discipline 
management, directors, and even the controlling shareholder as they 
must internalize much of the costs experienced by market declines. 
Consequently, it is in the best interest of the controlling shareholder 
to pressure management and directors to improve share price and not 
to engage in any wealth diverting activities. In turn, this will increase 
the value of the firm and produce a financial benefit for all 
shareholders. Conversely, the discipline of the securities market is 
highly ineffective against dual class firms.  
 
The effectiveness of the securities market is further inhibited by the 
illiquidity of superior voting shares.65 While inferior voting shares 
can be bought and sold readily on public stock exchanges, superior 
shares are often in limited supply and in a lot of cases do not even 
trade at all.66 As a consequence, they are less susceptible to market 
fluctuations and work to protect the value of the controlling minority 
shareholder’s equity. This insulated position from the securities 
markets can, in turn, lead to a misalignment of interests between the 
controlling and non-controlling shareholders. For instance, in 2003 
the Bombardier family was offered a $1 billion dollar investment 
from the OTPP in return for giving up its dual class share structure.67 
At the time, the investment would have helped the struggling 
                                                
64 Halpern, supra note 15 at 27. 
65 Gry, supra note 8 at 3. 
66 Ibid. 
67 SHARE, supra note 3 at 12. 
Vol. 21 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies  
 
77
company with its highly leveraged balance sheet by allowing it to 
reduce some of the capital costs associated with its loans.68 However, 
the Bombardier family, rather than improving the corporation’s 
financial situation, sought to maintain control of the firm and refused 
the offer. Subsequently, the firm resorted to issuing $1.2 billion of its 
subordinated voting shares at a price just above its 52-week trading 
low.69 In effect, while the existing holders of the subordinated stock 
suffered a dilution70 and the company “paid a higher price for the 
new capital than it should have…Bombardier was able to remain in 
Bombardier hands.”71 This example illustrates that the desire of 
controlling minority shareholders to maintain their position within a 
firm can work to override the influence that the securities market can 
have on their decision-making. If, at the time of the OTPP offer, the 
Bombardier family had a larger equity stake in the firm or, at the 
very least, if its equity was not so insulated from the securities 
market, it is more likely that the firm would have made the more 
rational and cost efficient choice of accepting OTPP’s offer. These 
types of actions and choices are further enhanced by the entrenched 
and insulated position that controlling minority shareholders have 
against the market for corporate control. 
 
Generally, the market for corporate control refers to corporate 
takeover bids and the transfer of ownership and control of publicly 
traded companies. Primarily facilitated by the securities market, it 
functions best in instances of firms with highly dispersed 
ownership.72 Halpern argues that in such firms underperformance 
often produces a lower stock price, which in turn attracts potential 
acquirers who believe they can expand the performance of the firm 
by either removing management, achieving economies of scale, or 
increasing market share.73 In this way, the theoretical threat of 
replacement encourages management to maximize corporate 
performance and shareholder returns.  
                                                
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Stock dilution occurs when a public corporation issues additional common stock. 
The additional issuance of stock, notwithstanding other effects, reduces the 
proportion of existing shareholder positions in the firm and can affect the amount 
of control they wield over the firm. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Halpern, supra note 15 at 18. 
73 Ibid. 




However, as with the securities market, this situation is much 
different in cases of controlled or dual class firms. Firstly, if 
controlling minority shareholders make poor corporate decisions and 
the value of the firm’s shares decline, then the market for corporate 
control will not work to discipline these actions. Though securities 
markets will produce a lower share price to reflect 
underperformance, “the lower price is not a signal for a takeover but 
is just a cost to the non-controlling shareholders.”74 As previously 
mentioned, this reduction in share value will have a negligible 
impact on the limited and insulated shareholdings of the controlling 
minority shareholder, and it is unlikely to affect their ability to 
continue extracting private benefits. Moreover, even if the share 
price of the dual class firm declines to the point where there are 
potential acquirers, the absolute control that the controlling 
shareholder wields over the firm’s votes allows them to effectively 
quash any attempts to allow the acquisition to proceed. 
 
Secondly, in order for a takeover bid to be successful, the target 
company’s board of directors must determine that it is in the best 
interests of all shareholders and must approve the sale. Controlling 
minority shareholders seeking to maintain control will often be 
disinclined to accept such a bid and relinquish their position. Though 
Halpern argues that the board may still be deeply concerned with the 
interests of non-controlling shareholders, he also claims that the 
board will realize that the superior-voting shareholder has ultimate 
control and is thus unlikely to counter or oppose his or her 
interests.75 According to a report compiled by the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Conrad Black, through his 
controlling minority position in Hollinger Inc., routinely appointed 
the majority of board members who “were unlikely or unwilling to 
oppose his authority.”76 As such, the controlling minority 
shareholders’ special voting privileges allow them to control or 
heavily influence the board to prevent a takeover threat and 
ultimately remain in control of the firm. 
 
Lastly, prior to the TSX’s imposition of the non-retroactive coat-tail 
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provision in 1987, controlling minority shareholders could sell their 
controlling positions at a premium77 while no equivalent offer or 
purchase had to be made for the company’s inferior voting shares. In 
this case, the controlling minority shareholder could simply sell 
control of the firm to a potential acquirer willing to pay such a 
premium.78 As such, in the event of a takeover, controlling minority 
shareholders were (and to a large extent still are) able to extract large 
financial premiums while excluding the interests of non-controlling 
shareholders.79 In addition, in the event that the sale of the 
controlling position proceeds, the acquirer simply assumes the 
controlling position in the firm, subjecting non-controlling 
shareholders to perpetual controlled ownership. This entrenchment of 
the controlling position in dual class firms adds to the weakened 
position of non-controlling shareholders and increases their 
vulnerability to potentially exorbitant agency costs and financial 
risks. 
 
V. Regulatory Response – Good, but not Good Enough 
 
Despite the concerns and issues surrounding dual class share 
structures discussed above, Canadian provincial regulators and 
public stock exchanges have imposed very limited regulations and 
requirements on these types of equity ownership arrangements. In 
particular, the Ontario Securities Commission (“OSC”) requires 
holders of inferior voting shares to receive the same information that 
holders of superior shares are entitled to, and calls for dual class 
firms to provide inferior voting shareholders with the right to attend 
shareholder meetings.80 In addition, the OSC requires that any 
“reorganizations or reclassifications of common shares into restricted 
voting shares must have the approval of the majority of the minority 
shareholders.”81 Perhaps the most significant restriction imposed on 
dual class share structures in Canada is the previously mentioned 
                                                
77 The premium that superior shares carry is a result of the control they grant their 
holder. As such, controlling minority shareholders are able to sell their shares at a 
premium due to the control they offer the prospective purchaser. 
78 Allaire, supra note 63 at 10. 
79 This relates to the fact that 13 firms currently listed on the TSX are still able to 
trade absent the coat-tail provision as it was not provided a retroactive status. This 
is discussed further in Section V. 
80 SHARE, supra note 3 at 9. 
81 Ibid. 
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provision implemented by the TSX that requires reporting issuers to 
provide coat-tail protections to non-controlling shareholders.82 Coat-
tail provisions require companies issuing superior voting shares to 
ensure that any offer made to purchase the firm’s superior voting 
shares must be accompanied by a concurrent offer at the same terms 
and conditions to the other inferior classes of shareholders.83 This 
provision eliminates a key source of private benefits for controlling 
minority shareholders, namely, “the possibility for a controlling 
shareholder to sell the control of the company and pocket the large 
premium that usually comes with control, while all other 
shareholders would receive no benefit from the transaction.”84 
 
Several studies conducted on dual class firms in Canada have 
concluded that as a result of the coat-tail protections, Canadian 
superior voting shares trade at some of the smallest premiums in the 
world.85 According to a study by Brian F. Smith and Ben Amoaka-
Adu, Professors of Finance and Economics at Wilfrid Laurier 
University, the median premium for superior shares of Canadian 
companies between 1988 and 1992 was 6.37 per cent.86 Tatiana 
Nenova, a Harvard Researcher currently at the World Bank, 
conducted studies on superior share premiums in 2000 and 2003 and 
estimates that the control premium in Canada ranges between 2 per 
cent and 4 per cent.87 Though the data collected largely confirms the 
conclusion that the coat-tail provision instituted by the TSX has 
successfully curbed the ability of controlling minority shareholders 
to extract premiums in the event of a sale, two problems still plague 
the effectiveness of the coat-tail provision. The first pertains to a 
loophole in the coat-tail protection that allows controlling minority 
shareholders to extract a premium when selling their controlling 
interest. The second refers to the fact that the TSX failed to provide 
the coat-tail provision with a retroactive status. 
 
Under the first scenario, a controlling minority shareholder may sell 
their interest in the firm at a premium, so long as the interest is sold 
                                                
82 Willes, supra note 12 at 701. “Reporting issuer” refers to a corporation that has 
issued its shares to the public by way of a prospectus. 
83 SHARE, supra note 3 at 9. 
84 Allaire, supra note 63 at 10. 
85 Ibid at 12. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
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to multiple parties and each party, on their own, is unable to exercise 
absolute control.88 This form of transaction does not trigger the coat-
tail provision as control is only achieved through joint and 
coordinated action. For example, in 1994, after the death of Frank 
Griffiths Sr., founder of WIC Western International Communications 
Ltd., his wife, Emily Griffiths, sold all her superior voting shares at a 
significant premium over the subordinated shares she sold at the 
same time.89 Though the company had a coat-tail provision in place 
that ought to have provided non-controlling shareholders with the 
option to sell their shares at the same premium, because the sale of 
the superior shares was to Rogers Communications, Shaw Cable and 
CanWest Inc., each of which were unable to garner absolute control 
individually, the coat-tail provision was not triggered.90 
Consequently, by selling her controlling interest to multiple parties, 
Mrs. Griffiths was able to escape the scope of the coat-tail and earn a 
premium on her controlling shares with no equivalent offer made to 
the non-controlling shareholders. 
 
The coat-tail provision’s lack of a retroactive status also limits its 
effectiveness in mitigating against the increased agency costs and 
risks associated with dual class firms. Consequently, a significant 
number of companies that listed their superior voting shares prior to 
1987 have been able to operate and trade absent a coat-tail provision. 
Currently, 13 of the 96 dual class firms listed on the TSX are 
permitted to trade without a coat-tail provision.91 One of these firms 
in particular, Magna International Inc., which created its multiple 
voting class share structure in 1978,92 has been the recent source of 
immense controversy and debate.  
 
In March 2010, Frank Stronach was asked by Magna’s management 
if he would be willing to abandon Magna’s dual class share structure 
and, by extension, his controlling minority position in the firm.93 
Following a month of discussions, Magna’s management informed 
                                                
88 Ibid at 22. 
89 SHARE, supra note 3 at 15. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 John Tuzyk & Christopher Kozub, “Ontario Court Approves Magna’s Plan of 
Arrangement” Blakes Bulletin (25 August 2010), online: Blakes  
<http://www.blakes.com/english/view.asp?ID=4186>. 
93 Ibid. 
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its board (“the Board”) of the potential offer to purchase Stronach’s 
controlling superior Class B shares. The Board subsequently 
established a special committee of independent directors of Magna to 
review, consider and negotiate with Stronach over the proposed 
purchase.94 The Stronach Trust, which is owned by Stronach and his 
family and is the actual legal owner of Magna’s superior voting 
Class B shares, agreed that it would “sell its Class B shares to 
Magna…at a premium of some 1800 per cent over Magna’s Class A 
shares.95 In addition, Stronach would receive a five-year consulting 
contract and equity and voting interests in an electric car partnership 
between Magna and Stronach Trust.”96  
 
While the Board retained CIBC to conduct the valuation and act as 
its financial advisor, CIBC was unable to provide a fairness opinion 
because the dilution associated with the transaction was 
unprecedented.97 At the announcement of the proposal, there was 
much debate among shareholder advisory groups and institutional 
investors. RiskMetrics Group Inc, a risk advisory firm, advised its 
clients holding Magna’s Class A shares to support the proposal 
because of the potential future benefits of the one share, one vote 
structure, including: elimination of the Stronach discount,98 
improved corporate accountability, and the removal of the 
impediment to future takeover threats.99 Glass Lewis & Co., a proxy 
advisor and wholly owned subsidiary of the Ontario Teacher’s 
Pension Plan (“OTPP”), on the other hand, strongly urged its clients 
to vote against the deal.100 Particularly, the OTPP “was concerned 
                                                
94Barry Reiter, “Lessons from Magna” Lexpert (September 2010), online: Bennet 




97 A fairness opinion is an evaluation, typically conducted by an investment bank 
or other professional advisory services firm, which provides an opinion as to 
whether the proposed transaction is “fair” or adequate.” Lucian Arye Bebchuk & 
Marcel Kahan, “Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What Can be Done 
about It?” (1989) Duke Law Journal I at 27. 
98 The Stronach discount refers to a general presumption that Magna’s Class A 
shares, prior to its recapitalization, traded at a significant discount due to the fact 
that control of the company was held solely by Stronach and control could be 
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that Stronach was being permitted to extract outrageous premiums 
from Magna under the guise of normalizing its governance 
structure.”101 The debates surrounding this proposal continued for 
several months and eventually culminated in a hearing at the OSC. 
Though several issues were considered by the OSC, it primarily 
focused on whether “the proposed transaction was abusive and 
should the Commission restrain it in the public interest?”102 
 
Impeding the arguments of those opposed and seeking to have the 
transaction barred by the OSC was the fact that Magna did not have a 
coat-tail provision in place. Moreover, because the deal was not a 
third party bid to acquire control but rather the company itself 
effectively paying to release control into the market, the coat-tail 
would not have applied. According to Professor Edward Waitzer, 
Former Chair of the OSC, if a coat-tail would have been in place, 
those opposed to the transaction would have argued that the policy 
concerns underpinning coat-tail provisions should have been invoked 
similar to the OSC ruling in Re Canadian Tire (1987).103 In Re 
Canadian Tire, the third party bidder sought to avoid and exploit the 
corporation’s coat-tail provision by purchasing only 49 per cent of 
the firm’s outstanding common voting shares.104 While the coat-tail 
was not triggered by the proposed transaction, the OSC intervened 
and ordered a cease trade order because the deal was “contrived to 
circumvent the coattail, and thus frustrate the intention of its well-
intentioned proponents.”105 In the case of the Magna transaction, the 
fact that no coat-tail provision was in place limited the ability of 
those opposed to the transaction to ground such an argument and to 
urge the OSC to invoke similar reasoning in prohibiting the 
transaction from proceeding. Ultimately, given the circumstances, 
the OSC held that Magna’s shareholders would best determine the 
deal’s fairness so long as they were provided with adequate 
disclosure in order to understand their interests and the ramifications 
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102 Ontario Securities Commission, In the Matter of the Securities Act and In the 
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of their decision. On July 23, Magna’s Class A shareholders voted 
75.3 per cent in favour of the proposal.106  
 
The overwhelming shareholder support for the recapitalization can 
be cast in two distinct lights. On one hand, it may be interpreted as a 
clear signal that the non-controlling shareholders of Magna were of 
the opinion that the premium the Stronach Trust was able to extract 
was reasonable and fair. On the other hand, however, the 
overwhelming support for the recapitalization may suggest that non-
controlling shareholders were dissatisfied with Frank Stronach 
continuously imposing his will on the firm and, as a result, were 
willing to pay a premium in order to remove his entrenched position. 
However, regardless of the reasons supporting the transaction’s 
approval, it is a deal that has remained largely criticized as a gross 
abuse and exploitation of non-controlling shareholders and Canadian 
capital markets. According to Anita Anand, a University of Toronto 
Law Professor and Chair of the OSC’s Investor Advisory Panel, the 
incredibly constrained choice that shareholders were presented with 
is indicative of “the power of the despot.”107 At the deal’s close, it 
was estimated that Mr. Stronach obtained more than US$863 million 
from Magna International Inc. for abolishing Stronach Trust’s Class 
B superior voting shares.108 In addition, given that part of this payout 
was in the form of 9 million common Class A shares, non-controlling 
shareholders suffered a stock dilution of approximately 11.4 per cent, 
a rate considered off the charts by most investment banks, as typical 
dilutions range between 1 and 4 per cent.109 For Anand, the Magna 
recapitalization carries important precedential value and implications 
for capital markets as a whole. Specifically, she states that “after 
Magna, the greater the private benefits of control, the higher the 
premium that will be paid to extricate firms from [their] controlling 
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shareholders.”110 Furthermore, in opposition to those who have 
argued that Magna’s non-controlling shareholders were offered the 
opportunity to vote on the recapitalization, Jeffrey MacIntosh, 
Toronto Stock Exchange Chair at the University of Toronto Faculty 
of Law, has argued that “claiming a shareholder vote…says nothing 
about whether the transaction is fair.”111 Specifically, he maintains 
that “while Magna ticked all the applicable boxes, the transaction 
[violated] many of the fundamental underpinnings of contemporary 
corporate and securities law.”112 Lastly, the OSC, despite approving 
Magna’s recapitalization, recently released the reasons to its decision 
and characterized several aspects of the deal as “fundamentally 
flawed.”113 
 
The coat-tail provision’s lack of a retroactive status, therefore, erodes 
its effectiveness and permits controlling minority shareholders of 
dual class share structures pre-dating 1987 to extract large premiums 
in exchange for relinquishing their control. Furthermore, with 13 
major dual class firms currently listed on the TSX operating without 
a coat-tail provision, each of the controlling minority shareholders of 
these firms could legally sell their controlling interest for a 
significant premium, without any equivalent offer being made to the 
non-controlling shareholders of the firm. Thus, while the 
implementation of the coat-tail provision was an important measure 
instituted by the TSX to curb the extraction of such premiums, it is a 
measure that remains susceptible to abuse and exploitation in 
Canadian capital markets. 
 
VI. Recommendation for Reform 
 
On the basis of the above analysis, it is clear that the equity structure 
of dual class firms enhances many of the concerns and risks of more 
traditional corporate ownership models. It is also evident, despite the 
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efforts of the OSC and TSX, that the current regulatory regime is 
inadequate to deal with these enhanced governance concerns. 
However, with dual class firms producing superior returns for their 
controlling shareholders, whether in the form of private benefits or 
cash flow, any proposals that work to limit these gains are going to 
be met with significant opposition and resistance. Thus, in seeking to 
introduce new mechanisms that improve the governance of these 
firms, a balance must be struck that improves accountability to non-
controlling shareholders without completely alienating the interests 
of current controlling minority shareholders. It is in this sense that 
the proposal for introducing a retroactive voting cap provision is 
endorsed, as it represents a highly practical and effective means of 
enhancing the overall governance of CMSs. 
 
A voting cap, in its most fundamental sense, involves limiting the 
ratio of votes between superior and inferior shares. As such, instead 
of allowing entrepreneurs and founders the freedom to attribute any 
concentration of voting rights to their particular class of controlling 
shares, there ought to be retroactive legislated restrictions on these 
rights. For instance, returning to the case of Magna International Inc., 
where Frank Stronach’s Class B shares carried 500 votes while Class 
A shares only wielded 1 vote, a legislated cap would prevent such 
disproportionate voting power and influence.114 Under the proposed 
voting cap, superior shares would be restricted to a maximum 
number of votes, some suggest between 4 and 10 votes, while 
inferior shares, in most cases, would yield 1.115 Consequently, in 
order for controlling minority shareholders to exercise control over a 
company, they would have to significantly increase their equity in 
the firm. Though it is not yet certain what specific ratio should be 
constructed or introduced, what is important is how this proposal will 
improve the monitoring function of both the securities market and 
the market for corporate control.  
 
In order for this proposal to yield meaningful improvements in the 
governance of dual class firms, it is important that it include a 
retroactive status. Drawing on much of the failure and criticism 
surrounding the coat-tail provision (most of which is directed at its 
lack of a retroactive clause) it appears that such a condition would 
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provide important strength and support to the implementation of a 
voting cap in Canada. With an estimated 25 per cent of companies 
traded on the TSX utilizing multiple class shares, it is crucial that 
none of these firms be able to escape the proposed voting cap clause 
on the basis of non-retroactivity. This is further supported by the 
previously mentioned fact that at least 13 major dual class companies 
on the TSX continue to operate unaffected by the coat-tail provision. 
Thus, by reflecting on the flaws of the coat-tail provision, it is easy 
to rationalize the inclusion of a retroactive status for the voting cap 
proposal, as it should ensure that all dual class firms, regardless of 
their public listing date, comply with the proposed legislated voting 
restriction. Moreover, by ensuring greater adherence to this 
restriction, the retroactive clause will simultaneously help to improve 
the monitoring function of the securities market and the market for 
corporate control in relation to dual class firms. 
 
In combination with the proposed retroactive voting cap restriction, it 
is recommended that all Canadian dual class firms be required to 
eliminate their non-voting equity. In cases where firms currently 
offer non-voting stock to the public, these shares should be converted 
such that they yield at least one vote. The rationale supporting this 
recommendation is two-pronged. Firstly, the elimination of non-
voting stock would provide each shareholder, regardless of equity 
held, a degree of influence on the firm. Though in many cases this 
influence would be negligible, in the event that non-controlling 
shareholders were to coordinate their efforts, their ability to vote 
would serve as a tremendous advantage, especially in challenging 
proposals or actions by the controlling minority shareholder. 
Secondly, granting each shareholder a right to vote will eliminate the 
ability of dual class firms to exercise a potential loophole in the 
proposed voting cap. For example, if a firm was to adopt the voting 
cap restriction absent a provision for eliminating non-voting stock, it 
could, in theory, comply with the cap yet retain a sub-set class of 
non-voting stock/shareholders. Though the controlling minority 
shareholder would have fewer votes as a result of the cap, they 
would still maintain absolute voting power over the class of non-
controlling shareholders holding shares with no voting rights. 
Moreover, the non-voting shareholders would not be able to exercise 
any influence over the firm. Consequently, by counteracting the 
voting cap, controlling minority shareholders would still be able to 
exercise complete control over the firm while other shareholders 
Vol. 21 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies  
 
88
would wield little to no influence. Thus, in order for the proposed 
voting cap to be successful, it is essential that dual class firms also 
eliminate any of their non-voting stock. 
 
While the mechanics of the voting cap and its need for retroactive 
status are important, greater in significance and more central to this 
analysis is how these instruments will improve the monitoring and 
disciplinary functions of the securities market and the market for 
corporate control. Central to the voting cap proposal is the 
manipulation of voting rights, which will alter typical CMS 
ownership arrangements so that they more closely resemble a 
controlled corporate structure (“CCS”) where control is achieved 
through a majority equity position. By restricting the number of 
votes that superior shares wield, the voting power exercised by the 
controlling position is effectively diluted. Though the controlling 
minority shareholder may still be able to acquire more than 50 per 
cent of the corporation’s total votes, the only means in which to 
achieve such control is by simultaneously increasing their equity 
ownership and financial risk in the firm. Consequently, any risk 
taking, moral hazard, or diversionary activity that may produce a 
private benefit to the controlling shareholder, which generally results 
in a lower share price, also produces a significant cost to the equity 
they hold in the firm. Similar in effect to a CCS, the increased capital 
invested in the firm forces the controlling minority shareholder to 
bear more of the costs of their non-wealth maximizing behaviour. 
Thus, by aligning the controlling minority shareholders interests 
more closely to the firm’s overall value and the interests of other 
non-controlling shareholders, a voting cap provides a disincentive for 
them to extract private benefits and in turn mitigates against non-
controlling shareholder exploitation and agency costs.  It is this 
important equity requirement for exercising corporate control that 
will improve the functioning of the securities market in disciplining 
dual class firms and their controlling shareholders. 
 
Though a voting cap will undeniably improve the monitoring 
mechanism of the securities market, its imposition will not, however, 
guarantee the same degree of success in terms of the market for 
corporate control. The market for corporate control is most efficient 
when firms are widely held. The presence of a controlling position, 
whether a controlling minority shareholder or a controlling 
shareholder who has achieved control through equity, diminishes this 
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monitoring function. However, while a controlling minority 
shareholder is effectively entrenched and insulated from a takeover 
threat, a controlling shareholder in a CCS is somewhat more 
susceptible to takeovers. Thus, a voting cap that allows a CMS to 
function more like a CCS in takeover situations represents a modest 
improvement for the overall governance of the corporation and 
accountability to non-controlling shareholders. Moreover, beyond 
facilitating a more efficient market for corporate control, the dilution 
of the controlling minority shareholder’s voting power should 
improve the overall investment appeal of dual class firms and 
encourage greater institutional ownership and investment, a group 
that has traditionally opposed such structures. This may render the 
controlling position more susceptible to proxy contests and 
takeovers, and may lead to the creation of several large block 
investment holdings in the firm, similar to the co-determinant 
German and Japanese governance models.116 In turn, this may result 
in greater corporate oversight and a governance system with a 
broader set of checks and balances, as the interests of each block 
would be posited against the others.  
 
Moreover, with SHARE working with various pension funds in 
Canada to help promote greater shareholder activism, the 
introduction of a voting cap could help to support these important 
efforts.117 In turn, this could provide non-controlling shareholders of 
dual class firms with a superior means in which to raise proposals for 
change and encourage their participation at annual general meetings. 
Thus, utilizing a voting cap to dilute the voting concentration of a 
controlling minority shareholder may work to encourage corporate 
takeovers, increase institutional investments, correct the power 
imbalances associated with dual class firms, and generally result in a 
better corporate governance model that mitigates against the 




While there are some undeniable benefits associated with dual class 
firms and many, in fact, have produced financial returns similar to, or 
better than, more dispersed ownership structures, this does not 
                                                
116 Cioffi, supra note 56. 
117 SHARE, supra note 3 at 1, 18. 
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detract from the fact that these ownership structures significantly 
augment agency costs and financial risks for non-controlling 
shareholders. By manipulating typical corporate voting 
arrangements, dual class firms firmly concentrate control in the 
hands of a limited number of shareholders, threaten effective 
corporate governance practices, and violate the ability of non-
controlling minority shareholders to effectively influence corporate 
decision making. 
 
It has been argued that these adverse effects are primarily facilitated 
by the fact that the structure of dual class firms effectively erodes the 
traditionally successful internal and external corporate monitoring 
mechanisms. Though some, albeit limited, regulatory attempts have 
been made to curb the adverse implications dual class firms can have 
on non-controlling shareholder interests, these attempts have been 
largely ineffective in their aim. However, rather than banning these 
firms from Canadian capital markets, it has been argued that the 
provincial implementation of a mandatory retroactive voting cap 
restriction may serve as a practical and effective attempt to harness 
the benefits associated with dual class firms while mitigating their 
risks and improving their overall governance. 
 
Particularly noteworthy in Canada is the recent dual class share 
recapitalization of MI Developments Inc (“MI”), a firm also 
controlled by Frank Stronach and spun out of Magna International 
Inc. in 2003.118 The proposal to eliminate MI Developments’ dual 
class share structure was approved by its shareholders at its AGM on 
March 29, 2011 and was subsequently approved by the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice on June 30.119 The recapitalization, similar 
to that in Magna, was made by way of a plan of arrangement under 
the Ontario Business Corporations Act. According to Blair Franklin 
Capital Partners, which conducted the valuation of MI’s 
recapitalization, the transfer of assets to Stronach upon the 
cancellation of his controlling superior shares was “outside of the 
                                                
118 MI Developments Inc, News Release, “MI Developments Enters in Agreements 
For Shareholders to Consider Elimination of its Dual Class Share Structure” (31 
January 2011) online: <http://www.midevelopments.com/uploads/File/PR/Press-
Release-Dated-Feb-1--2011.pdf>. 
119 Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, MI Developments Eliminates its Dual Class Share 
Structure, online: BLG < http://www.blg.com/en/media-
centre/Pages/dealSuits_303.aspx>. 
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range of the consideration paid for comparable transactions relating 
to the collapse of a dual class share structure.”120 However, despite 
Blair Franklin’s formal valuation of Stronach’s Class B superior 
voting shares of US$50 per share, the final transaction translated into 
a final per share value somewhere between US$1,610 and US$2,009 
for Stronach’s controlling interest.121 Apart from this significant 
premium for ceding control of the firm, Blair Franklin estimates the 
resulting dilution to the subordinate Class A shareholders at 
approximately 31 per cent.122 This ruling, together with the decision 
in Magna, underscores the relevance and ongoing concern of dual 
class share structures in Canada. Furthermore, these cases shed light 
on the deference that decision makers afford to shareholder approval 
in such transactions, and presents an important avenue for further 
research and investigation into the recapitalization of dual class firms 
in Canada. 
 
Clearly, despite growing opposition, dual class share structures are, 
and will likely remain, a prominent and contemporary concern in 
Canadian capital markets. As a result, it is incumbent upon 
regulatory organizations, academics, legal and investment 
practitioners, and investors in general, to engage in further research, 
investigation, and critical debate into dual class share structures and 
the enhanced risks they pose to non-controlling shareholders. 
Ultimately, the question that must centre the debate is how the 
governance of dual class firms in Canada can be improved so as to 
mitigate their associated risks while still maintaining their inherent 











                                                
120 Supra note 118. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 






Date Company % Share Dilution 
May 2010 Magna proposal 11.41 
May 2006 Extendicare 1.28 
March 2006 Canam Group 3.04 
Dec. 2005 CoolBrands 0 
Sept. 2005 ProMetic Life Sci. 0 
March 2005 Diaz Resources 0 
Feb. 2004 MDC Partners 0 
Feb. 2004 Gildan 0 
Dec. 2003 Sherritt 0 
Source: Greg Keenan, Jeff Gray & Andrew Willis, “Stronach, the 
Fighter, takes the Magna Deal Controversy in Stride” The Globe and 
Mail (18 June, 2010), online: The Globe and Mail 
<http://www.globeadvisor.com/servlet/ArticleNews/story/gam/20100
618/FINALMAGNAOSC18ATL>. 
